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I. The Evolution of the Causation Standard in Title VII
The Civil Rights Act of 1964—commonly referred to simply
as Title VII—protects individuals from discrimination in the
workplace on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 1 The statute has achieved such prominence in American
society that scholars often refer to Title VII as a super-statute: 2
“a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a new
normative or institutional framework for state policy and (2) over
time does ‘stick’ in the public culture such that (3) the super1. 2 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (2012).
2. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1215, 1225 (2001) (noting that the Civil War produced some super-statutes,
most notably the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871).
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statute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad
effect on the law.” 3 Given its importance, it is not surprising that
intense conflicts arise over the scope and application of Title VII. 4
One of the more recent battles centers on the distinction between
the element of causation as applied to status-based
discrimination versus retaliation claims. 5 In 2013, the Supreme
Court decided University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar, 6 in which the Court determined that while status-based
discrimination only requires a motivating factor standard of
causation, retaliation claims must be proved by the higher
standard of but-for causation. 7 This Note will first examine the
history surrounding the battle over causation in Title VII 8 and
then attempt to break down the dominant interpretations of
Nassar by the district courts and divided by their respective
circuits. 9 Because all the circuits’ interpretations vary, this Note
will then suggest the various ways that judges can interpret
Nassar and which methods are most faithful to the purpose of
Title VII. 10
A. Historical Precedent Leading to Nassar
1. A Brief Overview of Title VII
Title VII can be largely divided into two distinct sections:
and
retaliation-based
status-based
discrimination 11
3. Id. at 1216.
4. See id. at 1237 (“Title VII’s principle has been debated, honed, and
strengthened through an ongoing give-and-take among the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches.”).
5. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013)
(holding that status-based discrimination and retaliation must be proved by
different standards of causation).
6. Id.
7. See id. (“[T]he Court now concludes as follows: Title VII retaliation
claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation,
not the lessened causation test stated in § 2000e–2(m).”).
8. See infra Part I.A (discussing history).
9. See infra Parts II–V (examining circuit splits).
10. See infra Part VI (providing recommendations).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2012) (outlawing discrimination by an
employer on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
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discrimination. 12 The status-based section prohibits employers
from acting adversely against employees based on their status in
a protected class. 13 For example, an employer cannot mistreat or
fire an employee simply because she happens to be female. 14 The
retaliation section, on the other hand, protects employees from
adverse action if they speak out against discrimination. 15 For
example, if our female employee above is fired because she is
female, and another employee accuses the employer of
discrimination, then the employer cannot then fire the second
employee in retaliation for opposing the first discriminatory
action. 16 Essentially, the retaliation section encourages
employees to speak out against discrimination without fear of
retaliation. 17
2. Price Waterhouse: “Because of” Does Not Mean “But-for”
The Supreme Court first tackled the causation standard of
Title VII in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 18 Price Waterhouse
concerned a female employee, Ann Hopkins, in an accounting
firm whose candidacy for partnership was put on hold. 19 The firm
selected partners based on recommendations of other partners,
who either voted to accept, put on hold, or deny the candidate. 20
While the vast majority of partners approved accepting Hopkins
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2012) (outlawing discrimination by an
employer in retaliation to an employee’s actions or statements).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2012) (listing the classes protected by the
statute).
14. See id. (stating that an employer may not “discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2012) (stating that an employer may not
discriminate against an employee “because [an employee] has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”).
16. Id.
17. See id. (encouraging employees to oppose discrimination and to
participate in enforcement proceedings for Title VII).
18. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2012).
19. Id. at 231–32.
20. Id. at 232–33.
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as a partner, a few voted to reject her because she was too
abrasive and aggressive for a woman. 21 The Court had to decide
whether employers could avoid liability by showing that, even
though discrimination played a role in their decision, they would
have made the same decision anyway. 22 The Court observed that
the language of Section 2000e–2(a)(1) forbids discrimination
“because of such individual’s . . . sex” and ultimately found that
applying a but-for standard of causation would be improper. 23
The Court concluded that the plaintiff needed to prove that her
sex was a “substantial” or “motivating factor” in her employer’s
decision to take adverse action against her. 24
However, Congress expressed disapproval of the Court’s
decision by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 25 which clarified
that an employer has discriminated against an employee if “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.” 26 This means that in mixed motive cases
employers could be held liable if discriminatory animus played
any role in their decision making, but not necessarily a
substantial role. 27 In short, Congress sent a strong message that
any amount of discrimination in the workplace is too much and
will not be tolerated.

21. Id. at 233–35.
22. See id. at 237 (describing the question before the Court and the
decisions of the district and circuit courts).
23. See id. at 240 (emphasis added) (“To construe the words ‘because of’’ as
colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for causation,’ . . . is to misunderstand them”
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), (2) (1964))).
24. Id. at 249–50.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2012).
26. Id.
27. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (applying
§ 2000e–2(m) and concluding that plaintiffs do not need to show direct evidence
of discrimination, merely “present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice’” (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m))).
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3. Gross: “Because of” Does Mean “But-for”

After Waterhouse Price, the Court did not address the issue
of causation again until Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 28
which considered whether the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”) authorized a mixed-motive standard
for age discrimination claims. 29 Gross concerned a male employee,
54 years old, who worked for a financial firm which demoted and
replaced him with a younger employee. 30 While the plaintiff
claimed that his employer demoted him because of his age, the
defendant claimed that the plaintiff was reassigned because of
corporate restructuring and put in a “position [that] was better
suited to his skills.” 31 The Court had to consider whether the
plaintiff could prevail by proving that age was a motivating factor
in his demotion, even if it was not the sole factor. 32 The Court
concluded that the fact that the ADEA makes it unlawful to
discriminate “because of such individual’s age” 33 suggests that a
but-for standard of causation must be applied and, thus, the
plaintiff had to show that age was the decisive factor, not just a
motivating factor, in his demotion. 34 While the Court
acknowledged that Congress had amended Title VII to clarify
28. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
29. See id. at 175–76 (discussing whether the text of the ADEA suggests a
different causation standard than what Title VII mandates for status-based
discrimination claims).
30. Id. at 170.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 173 (addressing the question of whether affirmative evidence
must be presented in a mixed-motive discrimination case in order to get the jury
instruction).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
34. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv.’s, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (finding that the
ADEA prohibits discrimination because of age, so the plaintiff, must use a butfor standard to show that age was the decisive factor in his demotion). The
opinion stated:
[T]he ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s requirement that an employer
took adverse action ‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ that
the employer decided to act. To establish a disparate-treatment claim
under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must
prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse
decision.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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that “because of” meant a motivating factor standard of
causation, it also concluded that failure to amend the ADEA
demonstrated an absence of Congressional intent to adopt the
same standard. 35 This reasoning set the stage for the Court’s
decision in Nassar just four years later.
B. Nassar and the New Causation Standard for Title VII
1. The Majority: Treating Retaliation Differently than StatusBased Discrimination
The Court finally addressed the issue of causation in the
Title VII context again in Nassar and drew a line between statusbased discrimination and retaliation-based discrimination. 36
Nassar concerned a doctor of Middle-Eastern descent who alleged
that his superior had harassed him on racial and religious
grounds. 37 He then complained about the harassment, and the
hospital retaliated against him through constructive discharge. 38
Prior to the Court’s decision in Nassar, many courts reasoned
that the motivating factor standard of causation applicable to
status-based discrimination should also apply to retaliation
claims under Title VII. 39 The Supreme Court, however,
35. See id. at 174 (“Unlike Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that
a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a
motivating factor. Moreover, Congress neglected to add such a provision to the
ADEA when it amended Title VII.”).
36. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013)
(holding that retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate is the
but-for cause of the employment action).
37. Id. at 2523–24.
38. Id.; see also Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004)
(defining constructive discharge as a situation in which a worker is coerced to
quit or resign a position due to a hostile or intolerable work environment
created by the employer).
39. See Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir.
2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (showing that the Fifth Circuit did not
believe there was any question what standard of causation should be applied to
the retaliation claim in Nassar); see also Saridakis v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist.,
468 F. App’x 926, 931 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting a circuit split on the issue
between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, but ultimately deciding that the
motivating factor standard should apply because Gross does not control); Lore v.
City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 167 (2d Cir. 2012) (commenting on how a jury’s
finding that the complaints of discrimination made by the plaintiff were a
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determined that retaliation claims must be proved under the
much higher but-for standard of causation. 40 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, stated that the rationale the Court used
in Gross for ADEA claims was applicable to Title VII retaliation
claims. 41 Declining to apply Price Waterhouse to Nassar, the
majority determined that § 2000e–(2)(m) did not apply to
retaliation claims because it falls under a different section in the
Civil Rights Act than retaliation which appears in § 2000e–3. 42
Some scholars believe that Nassar and Gross illustrate the
belief, held by some members of the Court, that there are too
many Title VII claims filed per year, and judges should have
more tools to prohibit “frivolous” lawsuits from going to trial. 43
Empirical data from the Equal Employment and Opportunity
Commission shows that retaliation claims have risen over the
years, 44 while status-based discrimination claims have fluctuated
over a 15 year period and shown either minimal growth or
minimal decline. 45 Therefore, it is entirely possible that the
Court’s reasoning is rooted in these policy concerns and an
attempt to decrease the number of Title VII cases filed per year.

motivating factor in the defendant’s act of retaliation, and therefore the plaintiff
had proved causation); see also Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 935
(3d Cir. 1997) (holding that § 2000e–2(m) does not apply to retaliation claims).
40. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533 (“Title VII retaliation claims must be
proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened
causation test stated in § 2000e–2(m).”).
41. Id. at 2521; see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Supreme Court’s 2012–2013
Labor and Employment Law Decisions: The Song Remains the Same, 17 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 157, 164 (2013) (“The Court ultimately held that the
rationale of Gross was equally applicable to Title VII retaliation claims.”).
42. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2529 (“When Congress wrote the motivatingfactor provision in 1991, it chose to insert it as a subsection within § 2000e–2,
which contains Title VII’s ban on status-based discrimination, § 2000e–2(a) to
(d)(l), and says nothing about retaliation.”).
43. See Hirsch, supra note 41, at 167 (stating that the majority of justices
on the Court express concerns over frivolous lawsuits).
44. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY
1997 THROUGH FY 2015 http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
charges.cfm (last visited Sept. 14, 2016) (showing a steady growth in number of
claims filed and a 2.2% increase in the number of retaliation claims filed from
2012 to 2013).
45. See id. (showing changes per status as 1.6% for race, -1.0% for sex, 0.5%
for national origin, 0.2% for religion, and 0.7% for color).
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2. The Dissent: Nassar is Contrary to the Purpose of Title VII
Justice Ginsburg led a four-member dissent in Nassar
challenging the majority’s reasoning as contrary to Congress’s
intent in adding § 2000e–2(m) to the statute. 46 The dissent also
pointed out the practical complications of having two standards of
causation for different Title VII claims, especially when statusbased discrimination and retaliation claims are often alleged
together. 47 Employing two different standards places a greater
burden on trial judges who must instruct juries on causation—a
complicated concept to convey even in the best of circumstances:
“[a]sking jurors to determine liability based on different
standards in a single case is virtually certain to sow confusion.” 48
Additionally, as the dissent points out, the retaliation provision
in Title VII is vital to the purpose of the statute because
retaliation is likely to be more coercive than status-based
discrimination. 49 Justice Ginsburg ultimately encouraged
Congress to correct the Court like it did in Price Waterhouse by
issuing another Civil Rights Restoration Act. 50
Because Nassar is still fairly recent, the full effect of a butfor standard of causation on retaliation claims is difficult to
predict. It is entirely possible that “judges will generally come to
the same result they would have under the motivating factor
standard, while simply using different language.” 51 However, as
many district courts have noted, the new standard also makes it
harder for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment. 52 As this Note
46. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2541 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court
ascribes to Congress the unlikely purpose of separating retaliation claims from
discrimination claims, thereby undermining the Legislature’s effort to fortify the
protections of Title VII.”).
47. See id. at 2546 (stating that while statutes may sometimes lead to
confusion, the Court’s decisions should not add to the confusion).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 2534–35 (explaining the importance of Title VII retaliation
and stating that “‘fear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent’
about the discrimination they have encountered or observed”) (quoting Crawford
v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 279 (2009))).
50. See id. at 2547 (“Today’s misguided judgment . . . should prompt yet
another Civil Rights Restoration Act.”).
51. Hirsch, supra note 41, at 164.
52. See, e.g., Castonguay v. Long Term Care Mgmt. Servs., L.L.C., No.
1:11CV682, 2014 WL 1757308, at 7 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 30, 2014) (“Nassar makes
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will explain, district courts have already divided on how to apply
Nassar, not only with respect to what plaintiffs must show to
survive summary judgment, but also in regard to when judges
should apply the new standard of causation. 53 It may be that the
confusion that Justice Ginsburg warned would follow Nassar 54
will result in a new circuit split unless Congress amends the Civil
Rights Act.
II. Summary Judgment and When the But-For Test is Applied in
Relation to the McDonnell Douglas Framework
At the summary judgment stage of a Title VII case, courts
use the McDonnell Douglas 55 framework to determine whether
there is an issue of fact for a jury to decide if direct evidence of
discrimination is lacking. 56 Under the framework, i) the plaintiff
must show a prima facie case of retaliation, ii) the burden then
shifts to the defendant to show legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for the adverse action, and iii) if the defendant offers
legitimate reasons, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that those reasons are a pretext for unlawful
discrimination. 57 Nassar, however, raises questions about how
and when the but-for standard of causation should be applied
within the framework; and the various circuits already disagree
about the correct application of law. 58

Castonguay’s task more difficult in this case.”).
53. See infra Parts II–V (examining interpretations of Nassar).
54. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2546 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (warning that
Nassar will lead to confusion).
55. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
56. See e.g., Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“The burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas . . . governs
retaliation claims.”).
57. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–5; see also Zann Kwan v. Andalex
Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 844–46 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying the McDonnell Douglas
framework and the heightened standard of causation).
58. See Foster v. Univ. of Md.E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 250–51 (4th Cir.
2015) (discussing the disagreement of Nassar amongst sister circuits).
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A. Applying the Causation Standard in the Last Stage of the
McDonnell Douglas Framework
While there is disagreement on when to apply the but-for
standard of causation within the McDonnell Douglas framework,
most in the Second Circuit have firmly and consistently applied it
in the last stage of the framework. 59 In this version of the test, if
the employer passes the second stage of the framework, then “the
presumption of retaliation dissipates, and the plaintiff must show
that, but-for the protected activity, he would not have been
terminated.” 60 As a consequence, the forgoing method has
noticeable effects on a plaintiff’s ability to survive summary
judgment. 61
In Ellis v. Century 21 Department Stores, 62 a female
employee of a retail store alleged that she had been treated
unfairly following her reporting of a potential sexual harassment
issue involving her supervisor and a coworker. 63 The plaintiff
then complained of mistreatment and alleged that she was
terminated following her complaint. 64 The defendant argued
instead that it fired the plaintiff for poor work performance. 65
While discussing the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
the Eastern District of New York declined to apply a but-for
standard of causation during the first step of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. 66 Instead, the court relied on temporal
proximity to establish the prima facie case, i.e., inferred a causal
connection from the fact that only a short time elapsed between
59. See, e.g., Ellis v. Century 21 Dept. Stores, 975 F. Supp. 2d 244, 279
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (introducing the method of applying Nassar during the last
stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework); see also Brooks v. D.C. 9 Painters
Union, No. 10 Civ. 7800(JPO), 2013 WL 3328044, at 4 (S.D.N.Y July 2, 2013)
(stating the rule, but also finding that the plaintiff offered no evidence of
causation at all).
60. Id. at 279.
61. See id. at 288 (denying summary judgment for the defendant and
allowing claims to survive).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 255–56.
64. Id. at 264.
65. Ellis v. Century 21 Dept. Stores, 975 F. Supp. 2d 244, 264 (E.D.N.Y.
2013).
66. Id. at 284–85.

422

22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.411 (2016)

the protected activity and the adverse employment action. 67
Ultimately, the court determined that the plaintiff established a
prima facie case and, as a result, an issue of fact existed as to
whether the defendant had nondiscriminatory reasons for the
adverse employment action. 68 However, the court never examined
whether the plaintiff demonstrated that her complaints were the
but-for cause of termination. 69 In the end, the court allowed the
plaintiff to survive summary judgment based on temporal
proximity, allowing that presumption to override the standard of
causation. 70
While the forgoing test might be encouraging to plaintiffs, it
should also be noted that there is a perception among many
courts that the Nassar standard eliminates such use of temporal
proximity. 71 If this view gains widespread acceptance among the
circuits, the Eastern District of New York’s use of temporal
proximity in the first stage of the framework may be rendered
invalid. 72 It is also critical to note that while New York district
courts are consistently utilizing this method, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has not expressly adopted this method; but
it has strongly indicated that it approves of applying Nassar
primarily during the last stage of the framework. 73

67. See id. at 284 (establishing a prima facie case via temporal proximity
(citing Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010))).
68. See id. at 288 (applying the first two stages of the framework and
determining that there was an issue of fact).
69. See id. (examining the facts and holding that a reasonable jury could
find that retaliation was a but-for cause of plaintiff’s termination).
70. See id. at 285 (“Plaintiff has established that she was terminated less
than four months after she complained to Thomas about a potential sexual
harassment issue, and that alone is sufficient to raise an inference of
causation.”).
71. See infra Part III.
72. See infra Part III.
73. See Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 844–46 (2d Cir. 2013)
(addressing Nassar during the first stage of the framework, but only applying
the but-for standard during the last stage).
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B. Applying the Causation Standard Immediately or in the First
Stage of the McDonnell Douglas Framework
Additionally, the New York method of applying Nassar in the
last stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework seems to be in
the minority. 74 The Court of Appeals in some circuits have
determined that they should apply the but-for standard
immediately and void the need for the framework by finding that
the plaintiff cannot prove a prima facie case due to lack of
causation. 75 In a similar method, other circuits have simply
applied the but-for standard during the first step of the
McDonnell Douglas framework. 76 Both methods seem
functionally equivalent given that they apply but-for causation to
the prima facie elements. 77 Applying the standard of causation
before or during the first stage of the framework is the
application used by the Third 78 and Seventh79 Circuits, and
while the Fifth Circuit has not expressly adopted any particular
rule, dicta suggests that it may adopt the same standard. 80

74. But see Wesolowski v. Napolitano, 2 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1344 (S.D. Ga.
2014) (applying the but-for standard of causation in the last stage of the
framework and not during the establishment of the prima facie case).
75. See, e.g., Verma v. Univ. of Penn., 533 F. App’x 115, 119 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“[Plaintiff] has presented no evidence that suggests any causal connection
between her allegations of discrimination and her termination, let alone
evidence to suggest that such activity was the but-for cause of her
termination.”).
76. See, e.g., Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 2013)
(analyzing the plaintiff’s claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework and
applying the but-for standard of causation during the prima facie case).
77. Compare Verma, 533 F. App’x at 119 (showing how the court could
immediately apply Nassar to the elements of a prima facie case and eliminate
the need to even discuss the McDonnell Douglas framework), with Hobgood, 731
F.3d at 642 (applying Nassar to the elements of a prima facie case during a
discussion of the McDonnell Douglas framework).
78. See, e.g., Verma, 533 F. App’x at 119 (applying Nassar in lieu of the
McDonnell Douglas framework).
79. See, e.g., Hobgood, 731 F.3d at 642 (applying Nassar in the first stage of
the McDonnell Douglas framework).
80. See, e.g., Finnie v. Lee Cty., 541 F. App’x 368, 371 (5th Cir. 2013) (“To
meet the third prong [of a prima facie case], Nassar requires that Finnie provide
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that her filing of an
EEOC claim was the ‘but-for’ cause of her termination.”).
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Because three circuits have officially adopted the method of
applying the standard of causation during the establishment of
the prima facie case—rather than after the second stage of the
McDonnell Douglas framework—plaintiffs should take extra care
to strengthen their causation argument so that they can survive
the immediate hurdle discussed above.
III. The Effect of Nassar on Temporal Proximity to Prove a Prima
Facie Case of Causation
Many courts have long recognized the use of temporal
proximity to create the presumption of a causal connection
between the protected activity and adverse action. 81 The purpose
of temporal proximity is to create a presumption of wrongdoing
when an employer’s adverse actions closely follow an individual’s
protected behavior. 82 The use of temporal proximity is both a
useful and necessary tool for plaintiffs because “employers who
discriminate are not likely to announce their discriminatory
motive.” 83 Years of litigation and social change have taught
employers to never leave records that might point to
discrimination or to openly voice their intentions. 84 As a result,
most circuits allowed temporal proximity alone to satisfy the
causal requirement of a prima facie retaliation claim, including
the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits. 85 In contrast, the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
81. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)
(discussing how some of the circuits accept temporal proximity as a means to
establish causation); see also Patterson v. Johnson, 505 F.3d 1296, 1299 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (relying solely on temporal proximity to establish a causal connection
during summary judgment).
82. See Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1998)
(“[Temporal proximity] is indirect proof of a causal connection between the firing
and the activity because it is strongly suggestive of retaliation.”).
83. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 534 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
84. See Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 488–89 (2005)
(discussing how employment discrimination has become more subtle and how
employers are “increasingly savvy in not documenting, outwardly expressing, or
retaining anything that is potentially damaging.”).
85. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir.
2004) (finding a causal connection based solely on temporal proximity); see also
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Circuits do not allow mere temporal proximity to establish a
causal connection—it must be paired with other evidence. 86 In
circuits that have allowed temporal proximity alone to establish
causation, the main limitation is generally that the time that
elapses between the protected activity and the adverse action
must be “very close.” 87
It is clear that in circuits that frown upon temporal
proximity, Nassar will continue to prevent plaintiffs from relying
on suspicious timing to prove causation. 88 These courts reason
El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that
temporal proximity may be used to establish a prima facie case, however, it
cannot be used alone to show pretext); see also LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish
Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing temporal
proximity alone as a means to prove causation only were time between the
protected activity and adverse action were very close); see also Perry v. Kappos,
489 F. App’x 637, 643 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that temporal proximity may be
used to show causation only if the time period was very close); see also McCoy v.
City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 562 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that while close
timing may be enough to establish a prima facie element of causation, the
presumption dissipates if the employer offers a legitimate non-retaliatory
reason for adverse action); see also Barlow v. C.R. England, Inc., 703 F.3d 497,
509 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e have recognized that close temporal proximity
between the exercise of a right and an employee’s discharge may alone
constitute prima facie proof of causation.”); see also Thomas v. Cooper Lighting,
Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The burden of causation can be met
by showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected activity
and the adverse employment action.”); see also Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d
1344, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that the circuit has long recognized mere
temporal proximity as a means of establishing prima facie causation).
86. See Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668, 675 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“Temporal proximity alone cannot establish a causal connection.”); see also
Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating
that mere temporal proximity is not enough to establish causation, and must be
accompanied by supporting evidence); see Wallace v. Sparks Health Sys., 415
F.3d 853, 859 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[M]ore than temporal proximity is needed to
show a causal link between the discharge and the filing of the EEOC
complaint.”); see Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“A rule that any period over a certain time is per se too long (or, conversely, a
rule that any period under a certain time is per se short enough) would be
unrealistically simplistic.”).
87. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (citing
with approval cases suggesting that a four month period is too long to establish
temporal proximity).
88. See, e.g., Williams v. Serra Chevrolet Auto. LLC, 4 F. Supp. 3d 865, 879
(E.D. Mich. 2014) (“Thus, applying the teachings of Nassar and Gross here,
temporal proximity alone is not enough to allow a reasonable inference of ‘butfor’ causation.”).
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that a but-for standard of causation requires a more compelling
connection than the presumption that mere temporal proximity
creates. 89 What is less certain, however, is whether circuits that
previously allowed temporal proximity will feel the need to
abandon such analysis as a result of Nassar.
A. Abandoning Temporal Proximity
The circuit that seems most likely to abandon temporal
proximity is the Fifth Circuit due to the fact that, in the past, the
circuit expressed a reluctance to employ the doctrine of temporal
proximity, 90 thus making it more likely that it will completely
reject the doctrine after Nassar. While the Fifth Circuit has
previously allowed the use of temporal proximity to establish
prima facie cases, it also placed strict time limitations on that
use. 91 In addition, the Fifth Circuit case law can be read as
having simultaneously allowed and disallowed the use of
temporal proximity, thus leading to a confusing body of case
law. 92 In fact, the Fifth Circuit, where Nassar originated,
expressed conflicting views on the causation standard for
retaliation claims before 2013. 93 As a result, while the Fifth
Circuit officially acknowledged temporal proximity, it is likely to

89. See id. (“Under the stricter ‘but-for’ causation standard, temporal
proximity, standing alone, is not enough.”).
90. See Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., LLC, 482 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir.
2007) (“[T]emporal proximity alone is insufficient to prove but for causation.”).
91. Compare Myers v. Crestone Int’l, LLP, 121 F. App’x 25, 28 (5th Cir.
2005) (finding even a three-month time elapse between protected activity and
adverse action insufficient to meet temporal proximity), with Gorman-Bakos v.
Cornell Co-op Extension, 252 F.3d 545, 553–54 (2d Cir. 2001) (declining to
define how many months may pass before too much time has elapsed for use of
temporal proximity).
92. Compare McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 562 (5th Cir. 2007)
(recognizing that the Fifth Circuit allows use of temporal proximity), with
Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., LLC, 482 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]emporal proximity alone is insufficient to prove but for causation.”).
93. Compare Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 454 (5th
Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (applying a motivating factor standard
to the causation question), with Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., LLC, 482 F.3d
802, 808 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[T]emporal proximity alone is insufficient to prove but
for causation.”).
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reject the doctrine following Nassar due to its long-standing
animosity towards the doctrine. 94
B. Keeping Temporal Proximity
On the other hand, the district courts in the Second Circuit—
and many others—seem unaffected, applying temporal proximity
as they did pre-Nassar. 95 Specifically, because the Second Circuit
allows mere temporal proximity to establish the prima facie case,
but does not allow it to prove pretext (a rule which has always
been in place), the district courts appear to reach the same
conclusions they did before Nassar. 96 The Second Circuit is not
alone and is joined by other district courts, including several in
the Fourth Circuit. 97
While forgoing examples derive from district courts in which
the relevant Courts of Appeals have not yet spoken on the issue,
other circuits have taken a position. In Adams v. City of
Montgomery, 98 the Eleventh Circuit saw no conflict between
Nassar and allowing temporal proximity to establish a prima
facie case. 99 Adams explicitly states that Nassar requires a
showing of but-for causation, and that this “burden of causation
can be met by showing close temporal proximity between the
94. See Jones v. FJC Sec. Serv.s, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 3d 840, 854 (S.D. Tex.
2014) (collecting cases that express disapproval of temporal proximity, following
a discussion of Nassar).
95. See, e.g., Joseph v. Owens & Minor Distrib., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 295, 320
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding sufficient temporal proximity to establish a prima facie
case, but that same evidence insufficient to establish pretext).
96. See, e.g., id.; see Bowen-Hooks v. City of New York, 13 F. Supp. 3d 179,
230–31 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating that even if the plaintiff could prove temporal
proximity to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff cannot then prove
pretext).
97. See, e.g., Taylor v. Republic Serv.s, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 768, 797–98
(E.D. Va. 2013) (stating that Nassar requires but-for causation and that this
standard can be met through temporal proximity); see also Sumter v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield, Civil Action No. 3:11–03485–JFA, 2014 WL 4826150, at *8 (D.S.C.
Sept. 24, 2014) (applying temporal proximity post-Nassar).
98. Adams v. City of Montgomery, 569 F. App’x 769 (11th Cir. 2014).
99. See id. at 774 (stating that the plaintiff had failed to establish a causal
connection through temporal proximity because the time elapsed was not “very
close.”).

428

22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.411 (2016)

statutorily protected activity and the adverse action.” 100 In fact,
the Eleventh Circuit never indicated any concern over the
applicability of temporal proximity post-Nassar. 101 Similarly, the
Third Circuit in both Blakney v. City of Philadelphia 102 and
Verma v. University of Pennsylvania 103 validated the continued
use of the temporal proximity doctrine after Nassar. 104
C. Confusion Over the Contradiction Between Temporal Proximity
and But-For Causation
However, at least one district expressed confusion on how to
keep temporal proximity while also meeting the but-for standard
of causation. 105 The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia stated that temporal proximity is allowed to prove
causality while also suggesting that it cannot alone meet the butfor standard required by Nassar. 106 The District Court of D.C.
appears acutely aware of the inherent conflict between but-for
causation and the use of temporal proximity to create an
inference of causation. 107 The above confusion will ultimately
have to be remedied by the Court of Appeals.
100. See id. at 772–73 (citing Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d
1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007)).
101. See id. (showing that the court cited both Nassar and Thomas as
binding authority).
102. Blakney v. City of Phila., 559 F. App’x 183 (3d Cir. 2014).
103. Verma v. Univ. of Pa., 533 F. App’x 115 (3d Cir. 2013).
104. See Blakney, 559 F. App’x at 185–86 (utilizing temporal proximity postNassar); see Verma, 533 F. App’x at 119 (noting that, in a Title VII retaliation
case under Nassar’s causation standard, temporal proximity between the
protected activity and retaliatory action may satisfy causation).
105. See, e.g., Gray v. Foxx, 74 F. Supp. 3d 55, 73 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that
the D.C. Circuit has yet to speak on how Nassar affects temporal proximity).
106. Compare Lane v. Vasquez, 961 F. Supp. 2d 55, 67–68 (D.D.C. 2013)
(stating that a plaintiff may rely on temporal proximity, but going no further in
analysis because the court found no temporal proximity), with Francis v. Perez,
970 F. Supp. 2d 48, 68 (D.D.C 2013) (“Given that plaintiff offers no other
evidence beyond temporality of a causal connection, much less a but-for causal
connection between her alleged protected activity and the challenged actions,
the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could infer retaliation . . . .”)
(internal citations omitted).
107. See Gray, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 73 (noting that the D.C. Circuit has yet to
speak on how Nassar affects temporal proximity).
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So far, most circuits that previously allowed use of temporal
proximity to establish prima facie causation appear reluctant to
abandon the doctrine. Judges are probably hesitant to scrap long
established case law and doctrine concerning employment
discrimination, despite the apparent contradiction between the
old rules and Nassar. That being said, it is still early to predict
the full effects of the decision on the doctrine of temporal
proximity.
IV. Interpretations of the Nassar Standard and the Effects on
Plaintiffs’ Abilities to Survive Summary Judgment and Motions
to Dismiss
A. The Stricter Interpretation of the Nassar Standard
Some judges have specifically noted that Nassar heavily
influenced the outcome of their decisions. 108 In Shumate v. Selma
City Board of Education, 109 the Southern District of Alabama
(Eleventh Circuit) explicitly stated that had Nassar not required
but-for causation, the plaintiff’s claims would have survived:
Under the old standard, Shumate didn’t have to prove that she
would have gotten the job if the interview panel hadn’t
considered her lawsuit . . . . But post-Nassar, Shumate has to
meet a higher standard. In order to prove that she suffered
unlawful retaliation, she has to convince a jury that she would
have gotten the job if the interview panel hadn’t discussed her
other lawsuit. The evidence does not support that
conclusion. 110

Shumate, a school cafeteria worker, applied to become a manager
in the cafeteria. 111 She filed an EEOC complaint alleging
108. See, e.g., Shumate v. Selma City Bd. of Educ. (Shumate II), Civil No.
11–00078–CG–M, 2013 WL 5758699, at 1–2 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 2013)
(reconsidering its denial of summary judgment prior to Nassar, and granting
summary judgment after Nassar), aff’d, 581 Fed. App’x 740, 743 (11th Cir.
2014).
109. Shumate II, Civil No. 11–00078–CG–M, 2013 WL 5758699, at 1 (S.D.
Ala. Oct. 24, 2013).
110. Id. at 2.
111. Shumate v. Selma City Bd. of Educ. (Shumate I), 928 F. Supp. 2d 1302,
1310 (S.D. Ala. 2013).
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discrimination after she was passed over for the job. 112 Then,
three more management positions opened up at various schools,
and while she was considered for all three, she was selected for
none. 113 Shumate alleged that she had not been selected in
retaliation for filing her EEOC complaint. 114 In March, 2013, the
Southern District of Alabama denied the school board’s motion for
summary judgment on Shumate’s retaliation claim. 115 However,
the Supreme Court decided Nassar in June of the same year and
the defendant asked the district court to reconsider summary
judgment under the new standard of causation. 116 As a result of
the changed standard of causation, the court granted summary
judgment for the defendant. 117
In Rattigan v. Holder, 118 the District Court for the District of
Columbia determined that but-for causation means that if an
employer can put forth at least one legitimate reason for an
employee’s termination, even if the employee’s race or ethnicity
did play some role in the employer’s decision, then a plaintiff
cannot survive summary judgment. 119 This could be especially
problematic where a string of events leads to an employee’s
termination. For example, in Hubbard v. Georgia Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company, 120 the Middle District of Georgia
(Eleventh Circuit) reconsidered a motion for summary judgment
following Nassar. 121 In Hubbard, the plaintiff claimed that she
112. Id. at 1311.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1318.
116. Shumate II, Civil No. 11–00078–CG–M, 2013 WL 5758699, at *1 (S.D.
Ala. Oct. 24, 2013), aff’d, 581 F. App’x 740, 743 (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 2014).
117. Id. at *2.
118. Rattigan v. Holder, 982 F. Supp. 2d 69, 69 (D.D.C. 2013).
119. See id. at 82–83 (“[U]nder the Supreme Court’s recent ruling
in Nassar, it is now clear that a Title VII retaliation claim cannot rely on a
mixed motive theory.”).
120. See Hubbard v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5:11–CV–290
(CAR), 2013 WL 3964908, at *1 (M.D. Ga. July 31, 2013) (denying a plaintiff’s
retaliation claim on reconsideration because, even though the plaintiff had
originally satisfied the “motivating factor” causation standard, the plaintiff
could not satisfy the heightened “but-for” causation standard established in
Nassar).
121. Id.
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had filed a report of sex discrimination as well as a report of
sexual harassment. 122 The report of sex discrimination happened
three months prior to her termination and the report of sexual
harassment occurred three weeks prior to her termination. 123
Before Nassar, both claims survived summary judgment, but
afterwards the court determined that only the second report
passed the but-for standard of causation. 124 The Middle District of
Georgia explained that after the first report of sex discrimination
another incident, in which the plaintiff was accused of acting
unprofessionally, took place. 125 Because this incident took place
between the first report and the plaintiff’s termination, it broke
the causal chain and prevented a finding of but-for causation. 126
On the other hand, nothing happened in-between the second
report and the plaintiff’s termination. 127 Therefore, the second
report could be the but-for cause of her termination. 128
The troubling result of this kind of reasoning, however, is
that directly linking protected activity to adverse action will be
more difficult in more complex situations. 129 Savvy employers
could ensure that other incidents or conflicts with the employee
take place in-between the protected activity and the employee’s
eventual termination. It is not hard to imagine that an employer
could file any number of false accusations against an employee in
an attempt to break the causal chain between the employee’s
protected activity and the employer’s act of retaliation.

122. Id.
123. Id. at *1–2.
124. Id. at *1.
125. Id.
126. See Hubbard v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5:11–CV–290
(CAR), 2013 WL 3964908, at *1 (M.D. Ga. July 31, 2013 (identifying the
complaint of unprofessionalism as the fact that defeats the plaintiff’s argument
of causation).
127. Id. at *2.
128. Id.
129. See id. (finding that when there is any break in the causal chain, there
cannot be but-for cause for the original incident).
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B. The Foster Saga: Illustrating the Power of Interpretation

Interpreting Nassar and its effects on the already established
jurisprudence of Title VII is both tricky and contentious. The
decision of whether to embrace Nassar or rebel against it can
have dramatic effects on summary judgment. Consider the
complex issues presented in the case of Foster v. University of
Maryland Eastern Shore. 130 In Foster, the District of Maryland
(Fourth Circuit) reconsidered a denied motion for summary
judgment in light of Nassar, which was decided shortly after the
initial denial of summary judgment. 131 The plaintiff, Ms. Foster,
worked as a campus police officer at the University of Maryland
Eastern Shore, starting on a six-month probationary period. 132
Soon after she began working at the university, a male colleague
made sexual remarks to her and harassed her. 133 The plaintiff
complained to two different supervisors and the university
conducted an investigation, finding that her claims of sexual
harassment had merit. 134 The university disciplined and
reassigned the male employee to another location, but did not fire
him. 135 Then, when Foster’s probationary period was set to end,
the university extended the period by another six months. 136
After an injury, the university placed Foster on light duty and
denied her request to attend a training session. 137 At the end of
the probationary period, the university decided to terminate
Foster’s employment, stating “that it ‘had some concerns about
[Ms. Foster’s] work performance,’ her use of ‘almost all of her
130. See Foster v. Univ. of Md, E. Shore, 908 F. Supp. 2d 686, 708 (D. Md.
2012) [hereinafter Foster I] (denying summary judgment against a plaintiff’s
retaliation claim where the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to establish a
question of fact as to the issue of causation).
131. See Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, Civil No. TJS–10–1933, 2013 WL
5487813, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Foster II] (granting summary
judgment against the plaintiff’s retaliation claim on reconsideration because the
plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the heightened “but-for”
causation standard under Nassar).
132. Id. at *1.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Foster II, Civil No. TJS–10–1933, 2013 WL 5487813 at *1.
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accrued sick leave and personal leave’ and her inflexibility with
regard to scheduling.” 138 Foster then brought several claims
against the university, including a Title VII retaliation claim. 139
On the issue of causation, the district court originally
determined that “while perhaps Plaintiff does not make the
strongest claim of retaliation, and although the jury ultimately
may reject her claim, these incidents provide sufficient evidence
of ‘retaliatory animus’ to generate a jury question.” 140 The court
also found evidence of pretext, which cast doubt on the
university’s proffered legitimate reasons for terminating
Foster. 141 The defendant claimed that it had fired Foster because
of her inflexibility in regards to scheduling and also
dissatisfaction with her work performance. 142 The defendant,
however, failed to provide documentation to support this claim
and one of Foster’s supervisors directly denied both allegations. 143
The conflicting evidence raised a jury question that allowed
Foster to survive summary judgment. 144
Upon reconsideration, the court found this same evidence
insufficient to meet the heightened standard of causation after
Nassar. 145 The court acknowledged the weakness of the
defendant’s reasons for terminating the plaintiff, and even
expressed confusion on how Nassar could be applied to pretextual
evidence: “It is difficult to understand how Nassar’s heightened
standard of causation could apply at the pretext stage of
the McDonnell–Douglas analysis.” 146 However, the court decided
that the pretextual evidence—which was strongly in Foster’s
favor—could not be used to establish but-for causation because
“[a] reasonable jury might disbelieve UMES’s stated reasons for

138. Id. (internal citation omitted).
139. Id.
140. Foster I, 908 F. Supp. 2d 686, 708 (D. Md. 2012).
141. Id. at 711.
142. Id. at 709.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 711.
145. Foster II, Civil No. TJS–10–1933, 2013 WL 5487813, at *7 (D. Md. Sept.
27, 2013).
146. Id. at *6 n.6.
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terminating her, but no reasonable jury could believe that but-for
Ms. Foster’s complaint, she would not have been terminated.” 147
However, Foster’s saga did not end there. When the Fourth
Circuit weighed in on the issues presented by Nassar in 2015, the
Court of Appeals reversed the district court and found that its
reasoning pre-Nassar had been correct. 148 In fact, the Fourth
Circuit took the opportunity to strongly indicate that it has no
intention of altering its Title VII jurisprudence in light of
Nassar. 149
Nassar’s but-for causation standard is not the “heightened
causation standard” described by the district court, and does
not demand anything beyond what is already required by
the McDonnell Douglas “real reason” standard. A plaintiff
who can show that retaliation “was the real reason for the
[adverse employment action],” will necessarily be able “to show
that the harm would not have occurred in the absence of-that
is, but for-the defendant’s conduct[.]” . . . . We conclude,
therefore, that the McDonnell Douglas framework has long
demanded proof at the pretext stage that retaliation was a
but-for cause of a challenged adverse employment
action. Nassar does not alter the legal standard for
adjudicating a McDonnell Douglas retaliation claim. 150

The Foster cases illustrate that Nassar can have a dramatic effect
on a plaintiff’s ability to survive summary judgment. How a
district or circuit interprets the meaning of “but-for” causation
can alter the result of summary judgment even when the facts do
not change.
C. Effects on Motions to Dismiss
Additionally, a strict approach to applying Nassar opens up
attacks from defendants not only at the summary judgment
147. Id. at *6.
148. See Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015)
[hereinafter Foster III] (reversing the district court’s grant of summary
judgment against the plaintiff in Foster II and restoring the district court’s
original denial of summary judgment against the plaintiff in Foster I).
149. See id. (commenting that Nassar did not have an effect on the outcome
of Foster’s case).
150. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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stage, but also the motion to dismiss stage. Traditionally, “[a]
plaintiff alleging retaliation faces a low hurdle at the motion to
dismiss stage.” 151 “[W]hile a plaintiff is not required to plead facts
that constitute a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to
dismiss, . . . ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level[.]’” 152 The protection of a low
bar, however, can be weakened by a strict application of
Nassar. 153 For example, in Lance v. Betty Shabazz International
Charter School, 154 the Northern District of Illinois (Seventh
Circuit) determined that the plaintiff had not pled but-for
causation because there were other legitimate reasons why he
might have been fired besides retaliation. 155 The plaintiff alleged
that he had filed a complaint because he believed that his fouryear-old son was being discriminated against by the kindergarten
teacher because of his age (only five-year-olds were supposed to
be in the class but the child was four) and his race. 156 However,
the plaintiff was also a teacher at the school, and a memo from
the principal accused the plaintiff of starting an altercation with
another teacher over school supplies, using inappropriate
language in front of students, and missing four staff meetings. 157
The plaintiff maintained that these allegations were false and
sent to threaten him after he filed the complaint against the
school. 158 Also, while he admitted to being involved in a physical
altercation, he insisted that he had not been the aggressor. 159
151. See Teliska v. Napolitano, 826 F. Supp. 2d 94, 100 (D.D.C. 2011)
(collecting cases).
152. See Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010)
(citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–15 (2002); Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
153. See Lance v. Betty Shabazz Int’l Charter Sch., No. 12 CV 4116, 2014
WL 340092, at *8–9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2014) (granting defendant’s motion to
dismiss because of a lack of but-for causation).
154. Id. at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2014).
155. See id. at *9 (“Given the quantity and severity of the alternative
reasons for Lance’s termination, the Court concludes that Lance has not alleged
facts sufficient to support a claim that the filing of his . . . complaint with the
Department of Education was a but-for cause of the school’s decision to fire
him.”).
156. Id. at *2–3.
157. Id. at *3.
158. Id.
159. Lance v. Betty Shabazz Int’l Charter Sch., No. 12 CV 4116, 2014 WL
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As stated above, the court relied heavily on Nassar to find a
lack of causation between the filing of the complaint against the
school and the plaintiff’s termination. 160 Because the school might
have fired the plaintiff because of his fighting with another
teacher, his inappropriate behavior, or his failure to attend
certain staff meetings, his complaint could not have been the butfor cause. 161 However, as the First Circuit has noted, assessing
the plausibility of any alternative explanations for an employer’s
behavior is a task better left for the summary judgment stage. 162
[I]t is not for the district court or us to weigh now the merits of
these explanations [by the defendant] against the merits of the
explanations alleged by [the plaintiff]. Rather, [the plaintiff]
may proceed to discovery because she has alleged sufficient
facts to make the non-innocent explanation of these facts
plausible. 163

While the plaintiff in Lance alleged a scenario where the school
had both legitimate and non-legitimate reasons to fire him, “the
issue presented by a motion to dismiss is not whether a plaintiff
will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims.” 164
Taking Lance in its entirety, it is likely that the judge used
Nassar to grant the motion to dismiss because he distrusted the
plaintiff. 165 The judge expressed frustration that the plaintiff took
the opportunity to amend his complaint in order to delete facts
that the judge had previously identified as fatal to his case, and
to allege new and contradictory facts. 166 However, the judge also
340092, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2014)
160. See id. at *8–9 (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss because of a
lack of but-for causation).
161. See id. at *9 (stating that when the court views the complaint on the
whole, it sees a teacher involved in several various conflicts at school).
162. See Rodriguez-Vives v. P.R. Firefighters Corps, 743 F.3d 278, 286 (1st
Cir. 2014) (admonishing the district court for considering other possible motives
by the defendant at the motion to dismiss stage).
163. Id.
164. Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
165. See Lance, No. 12 CV 4116, 2014 WL 340092, at *1 (“[T]he Court has
some skepticism regarding the wholesale deletion of a number of previously-key
incidents that are missing from this new version of events, particularly since the
Court identified them as fatal to Plaintiff’s claims in the first instance.”).
166. Id.
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acknowledged that he could not officially consider the alterations
made between the original complaint and the amended
complaint. 167 Lance illustrates that one of the goals of the
majority in Nassar—that judges have more tools to dismiss cases
they believe to be frivolous—is achieved through a heightened
causation standard for Title VII retaliation. 168
V. Escape Hatches to Circumvent Nassar
A. The Convincing Mosaic Test
As mentioned above, one of the primary causes of concern
about a but-for standard of causation for Title VII retaliation is
that employers generally do not provide direct evidence of their
intent to discriminate. 169 The Seventh Circuit has an evidentiary
standard that allows judges who are resistant to adhering to
Nassar strictly—generally where they suspect that an employer
has discriminated, but the employer was also savvy enough to
produce little evidence of their intent—to circumvent the
restrictions of Nassar through the “convincing mosaic”
standard. 170 A common, but not exhaustive, list of what types of
evidence might be considered under the convincing mosaic test
includes:
(1) suspicious timing; (2) ambiguous statements or behavior
towards other employees in the protected group; (3) evidence,
statistical or otherwise, that similarly situated employees
outside of the protected group systematically receive better

167. See id. (“[T]he Court may consider only the first amended complaint”)
(citing Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., 725 F.3d 772, 782–83 (7th Cir. 2013))).
168. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531 (2013)
(“[L]essening the causation standard could also contribute to the filing of
frivolous claims, which would siphon resources from efforts by . . . [the] courts to
combat workplace harassment.”).
169. See supra Part III (discussing courts’ use of the temporal proximity
factor in light of the general absence of direct evidence of discriminatory intent).
170. See Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 2013)
(defining a convincing mosaic as a collection of “evidence from which an
inference of retaliatory intent could be drawn.”).
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treatment; and (4) evidence that the employer offered a
pretextual reason for an adverse employment action. 171

Given the general lack of “smoking gun” evidence left by
employers, 172 the convincing mosaic standard is an important tool
for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment. Plaintiffs that adopt
this approach, however, should be aware that alleging only one
type of suspicious evidence would generally not be enough to
convince a court that she has met the standard. 173 In this
instance, quantity, in addition to quality, of the evidence is
important because courts look at the case as a whole; the more
suspicious evidence a plaintiff can point to in order to bolster her
argument, the better. 174
While the Seventh Circuit developed the convincing mosaic
standard, the test has not yet been adopted by most circuits, with
the exception of both the First and Eleventh Circuits. 175 The test,
which is credited to Judge Posner, predates Nassar. 176 Over time,
Seventh Circuit judges who expressed frustration with the
rigidity of the McDonnell Douglas framework began to utilize the
test in order to circumvent that framework. 177 The convincing
mosaic standard is considered a direct method of establishing a
prima facie case and therefore allows a plaintiff to bypass the
171. Id. at 643–44.
172. See id. at 643 (“Such admissions of illegal discrimination
and retaliation are rare, so it is not surprising that Hobgood has not presented a
‘smoking gun’ confession by [the defendant].”).
173. See id. at 644 (stating that cases that point to only one piece in the
mosaic are “legion” and often fail to meet the convincing mosaic standard).
174. See id. at 644–46 (examining the evidence and stating that while some
of the evidence is ambiguous, there is also ample evidence for a jury to infer
wrongdoing by the defendant).
175. See Ahmed v. Johnson, 752 F.3d 490, 497–98 (1st Cir. 2014) (adopting
the convincing mosaic standard for status-based discrimination claims); see also
Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (adopting
the convincing mosaic standard from the Seventh Circuit for status-based
discrimination claims).
176. See Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994)
(showing the first instance of the term “convincing mosaic” in an opinion written
by Judge Posner).
177. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J.,
concurring) (“The original McDonnell Douglas decision was designed to clarify
and to simplify the plaintiff’s task in presenting such a case. Over the years,
unfortunately, both of those goals have gone by the wayside.”).
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McDonnell Douglas test. 178 In Judge Wood’s unusual concurrence
in Coleman v. Donahoe 179—unusual in that the three judge panel
signed both a unanimous majority opinion and a unanimous
concurrence—she wrote “separately to call attention to the snarls
and knots that the current methodologies used in discrimination
cases of all kinds have inflicted on courts and litigants alike.” 180
As Judge Hamilton—who also signed the concurrence—later
added in an address at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the American
Association of Law Schools, the purpose of the concurrence was to
call attention to common misuse of the McDonnell Douglas
framework in order to keep plaintiffs from reaching juries. 181
Judge Hamilton explained that, while it serves a legitimate
function, it is important to remember that the McDonnell
Douglas framework is “not the actual legal standard that a
plaintiff must satisfy.” 182 As a result, he argued that judges
should not be constrained by the framework and should deal with
employment discrimination cases in a manner similar to
negligence or criminal cases by taking the evidence on the whole,
rather than checking for a set list of circumstances that count as
discrimination. 183
While the convincing mosaic standard shows great promise
for plaintiffs seeking to survive summary judgment, it is also
unlikely that this method will prevail in courts that apply Nassar
strictly. For example, in Foster II, 184 the United States Court for
the District of Maryland examined the plaintiff’s argument that
178. See id. at 862 (explaining that the plaintiff used the indirect method to
prove her status-based claims, thus requiring the McDonnell Douglas
framework, while using the direct method for her retaliation claims did not).
179. Id. at 862–63 (Wood, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 863.
181. See David F. Hamilton, Judge for the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, Toward More Flexible Methods of Proof in Employment
Discrimination, Address to the Association of American Law Schools, Section on
Employment Discrimination Law (2013), in 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 195,
202 (“I hope that this opinion for the court in Coleman will be helpful in limiting
misuse of the McDonnell Douglas test, especially at the summary judgment
stage, and will also provide some useful points on critical issues where
McDonnell Douglas is often misapplied.”).
182. Id. at 203.
183. See id. at 203–04 (discussing the meaning of the Coleman concurrence
and the reason for the convincing mosaic standard).
184. Supra Part IV.
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she presented a convincing mosaic and found it insufficient to
meet the but-for standard. 185 The court decided that while the
plaintiff’s evidence might have established a “causal link”
between her protected activated and her employer’s adverse
actions, a causal link is not enough. 186 Therefore, the convincing
mosaic standard serves as a viable alternative only when district
judges are concerned that strict application of Nassar would
result in a false negative. 187
B. The Second Circuit’s Rephrasing of the But-For Burden
Under Kwan
In Nassar, the Supreme Court defined the but-for standard of
causation as one which “requires the plaintiff to show ‘that the
harm would not have occurred’ in the absence of—that is, but
for—the defendant’s conduct.” 188 As discussed above, 189 some
courts interpret this to mean that if an employer proffers just one
legitimate reason for taking action against the employee, the
employer wins summary judgment. 190 However, the Second
Circuit determined that Nassar does not mean that a motivating
factor standard is entirely inconsistent with the principles of but185. See id. (discussing the Foster saga).
186. See Foster II, Civil No. TJS–10–1933, 2013 WL 5487813, at *5 (“While
the evidence may have been sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find a ‘causal
link’ between her complaint and her termination, it is wholly insufficient to
allow a reasonable jury to find that her protected activity was the determinative
reason for her termination under Nassar.”).
187. Cf. Hamilton, supra note 181, at 197 (expressing the view that judges
who use the McDonnell Douglas framework too rigidly often grant summary
judgment to employers when it is not justified and place an undue burden on
plaintiffs).
188. See Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1934)).
189. Supra Part IV.
190. See Rattigan v. Holder, 982 F. Supp. 2d 69, 82–83 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Prior
to Nassar . . . it might have been possible for a jury to find liability for decisions
based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations because this
mixture would show that retaliatory animus was a motivating factor.”); see also
Hubbard v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Civil No. No. 5:11–CV–290 (CAR),
2013 WL 3964908, at *1 (M.D. Ga. July 31, 2013) (deeming that a single
intervening event that might have been legitimate grounds for firing the
employee was enough to break the causal chain under Nassar).

THE POWER TO RETALIATE

441

for causation. 191 Specifically, in Kwan v. Andalex Group LLC, 192
the Second Circuit stated that:
The Supreme Court recently held that a plaintiff alleging
retaliation in violation of Title VII must show that retaliation
was a “but-for” cause of the adverse action, and not simply a
“substantial” or “motivating” factor in the employer’s decision.
However, “but-for” causation does not require proof that
retaliation was the only cause of the employer’s action, but
only that the adverse action would not have occurred in the
absence of the retaliatory motive. 193

This interpretation permits the court to conclude that many
events might have led to the adverse action against the employee,
but if the driving force behind the chain of events or ultimate
decision was retaliation, the plaintiff survives summary
judgment. 194 The Second Circuit in Kwan also expressed concern
that “[t]he determination of whether retaliation was a ‘but-for’
cause, rather than just a motivating factor, is particularly poorly
suited to disposition by summary judgment, because it requires
weighing of the disputed facts, rather than a determination that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” 195 Based on
the forgoing, the court in Kwan appeared to rebel against the
restrictiveness of the Nassar standard and, as a result, any court

191. See Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 844–46 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A
plaintiff may prove that retaliation was a but-for cause of an adverse
employment
action
by
demonstrating
weaknesses,
implausibilities,
inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate,
nonretaliatory reasons for its action.”).
192. See id. at 834 (finding summary judgment improper on a retaliation
claim because the employee’s complaint to a company’s officer portrayed her
concerns to the company as a whole and the time period from the employee’s
complaint to her termination was sufficiently short to make a prima facie case
for causation).
193. Id. at 845–46 (internal citations omitted).
194. See id. at 846 n.5 (“Requiring proof that a prohibited consideration was
a “but-for” cause of an adverse action does not equate to a burden to show that
such consideration was the “sole” cause.”); see also Chan v. Donahoe, Civil No.
13–CV–2599, 2014 WL 6844943, at *25–26 (E.D.N.Y Dec. 4, 2014) (applying
Kwan and finding that the plaintiff had established a chain of events that could
lead a reasonable jury to believe that his employer built a disciplinary record
against him motivated by discriminatory animus).
195. Id. at 846 n.5.
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that is persuaded or bound by Kwan is more likely to deny
summary judgment. 196
Of course, district courts within circuits that more strictly
adhere to Nassar have criticized Kwan for its liberal and
divergent interpretation of but-for causation. 197 For example, the
Northern District of Alabama (Eleventh Circuit) has openly
rejected Kwan, and stated that Nassar requires retaliation to be
the sole cause of an employee’s termination. 198 The court
criticized Kwan and other like-minded courts for openly
combatting the Supreme Court of the United States’
interpretation of Title VII: “While some courts have continued to
label their post-Gross, Nassar, and Burrage causation standard
as ‘but-for,’ in reality they are requiring nothing more than a
‘positive incremental contribution,’ since without each
contribution, who can say that the result being examined would
have been reached. This is no more than what was required by
the now-rejected ‘motivating factor’ standard.”199 In the growing
circuit split over Nassar, whether a court cites Kwan approvingly
or disapprovingly is a good indication of whether that district is
rebelling against or strictly adhering to Nassar. 200

196. See Timothy M. Holly, The Causation Standard for Retaliation Claims
Under Employment Discrimination Statutes: Ambiguity of “Central Importance,”
15 DEL. L. REV. 71, 78–79 (comparing the Second Circuit approach with the
Third Circuit’s approach and concluding that plaintiffs are more likely to
survive summary judgment in the former).
197. See, e.g., Hendon v. Kamtek, Inc., No. 2:14–CV–2255, 2015 WL
4507990, at *5–6 (N.D. Ala. July 24, 2015) (considering the plaintiff’s argument
under Kwan and rejecting it as contrary to Nassar).
198. Hendon v. Kamtek, Inc., No. 2:14–CV–2255, 2015 WL 4507990, at *5–6
(N.D. Ala. July 24, 2015).
199. Id.
200. Compare id. (rejecting Kwan and granting motion to dismiss), with
Young v. CareAlliance Health Serv.s, No. 2:12–2337, 2014 WL 4955225, at *13
(D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2014) (referencing Kwan as the standard for but-for causation
post-Nassar and denying summary judgment).
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VI. Recommendations Concerning the Consequences of Nassar
and the Correct Application of the New Standard
A. Congressional Intent and Another Amendment to Title VII
One question that any reader of Nassar should immediately
ask herself is: did Congress actually intend for Title VII
retaliation claims to be treated differently from status-based
claims? As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, the answer is
almost certainly no. 201 When Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, it reaffirmed our nation’s commitment to deterring
discrimination in the workplace. 202 Congress expressed deep
concerns that the Supreme Court of the United States was
inappropriately cutting back on the protections that Congress
intended to give to employees. 203 In Price Waterhouse, the Court
interpreted the words “because of” in Section 2000e–2(a)(2) to
require that an employer’s discriminatory intent be a substantial
motivating factor behind its adverse action. 204 Congress
responded that even adding the word “substantial” to the
motivating factor test was a misreading and misunderstanding of
Title VII by the Court. 205 Employment decisions often involve
multiple considerations and motivations, and Congress made
clear that if even one of those considerations is based on
discriminatory reasons, that is one too many. 206 It is
remarkable—especially in light of Nassar—how much of a
201. See Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2535 (2013)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has seized on a provision, § 2000e–2(m),
adopted by Congress as part of an endeavor to strengthen Title VII, and turned
it into a measure reducing the force of the ban on retaliation.”).
202. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 17 (1991) (stating that Price
Waterhouse threatened to “undermine Title VII’s twin objectives of deterring
employers from discriminatory conduct and redressing the injuries suffered by
victims of discrimination.”).
203. See id. at 2 (“The bill responds to a number of recent decisions by the
United States Supreme Court that sharply cut back on the scope and
effectiveness of these important federal laws.”).
204. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249–50 (1989), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (1991).
205. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 17 (discussing why the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 would overturn Price Waterhouse).
206. See id. at 18 (expressing strong disapproval of the Court’s
interpretation because it does not hold employer’s liable for discrimination).
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reaction a single word, “substantial,” sparked from Congress;
particularly when Price Waterhouse did not raise the standard of
causation as high as the Court would later do in Nassar. 207 The
Court in Price Waterhouse explicitly stated that to “construe the
words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for
causation,’ . . . is to misunderstand them.” 208 Yet, twenty-four
years later the Court in Nassar did just that, taking “because of”
to mean “but-for causation.” 209 If Congress felt that the Court
grossly misunderstood the words “because of” when it required a
substantial motivating factor test be applied to status-based
claims, then Congress should now feel that the Court’s
interchanging of “because of” to mean “but-for causation” is an
even more egregious misreading of Title VII.
While the majority in Nassar tried to explain away the
disregard of Congressional intent by pointing out that statusbased discrimination claims and retaliation claims appear in
separate sections of Title VII, 210 this argument does not hold
water. As Justice Ginsburg stated, “the Court ascribes to
Congress the unlikely purpose of separating retaliation claims
from discrimination claims, thereby undermining the
Legislature’s effort to fortify the protections of Title VII.” 211 In
fact, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it
acknowledged that the changes to certain provisions of Title VII
were not to be limited solely to those provisions. 212 Congress
stated that the clarifications it made to the legal standards of
Title VII should be applied to any similar claims based on
207. Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 249–50 (stating that the
causation standard should be substantial motivating factor), with Univ. of Tex.
S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2527 (2013) (stating that the
causation standard should be “but-for.”).
208. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
2(a)(1), (2) (1964)).
209. See Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2527 (2013)
(stating that “because of” means “but-for.”).
210. See id. at 2529 (“When Congress wrote the motivating-factor provision
in 1991, it chose to insert it as a subsection within § 2000e–2, which contains
Title VII’s ban on status-based discrimination, § 2000e–2(a) to (d), (l), and says
nothing about retaliation.”).
211. Id. at 2541 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
212. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991) (discussing the relationship
between the amendments in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and other similar
laws).
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discrimination, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and the ADEA. 213 It is unlikely that Congress would
intend for its amendments to apply with equal force to other
statutes, but not apply consistently throughout the subsections of
a single statute.
The most straightforward way to resolve the conflict between
the Congressional intent of the Civil Rights Act and the ruling in
Nassar is obviously another amendment to the statute, clarifying
that Section 2000e–(2)(m) applies to retaliation. Justice Ginsburg
even called on Congress to correct the Court. 214 However, when
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it intended to
correct a long string of misrulings by the Court, not just Price
Waterhouse. 215 While the Court decided another case, Vance v.
Ball State University, 216 around the same time as Nassar, and
which also narrowed the application of Title VII, 217 two cases may
not be enough to prompt Congressional action.
B. The “Correct” Application of Nassar
Regardless of whether Congress decides to amend Title VII
in the future, judges must currently decide how to deal with
Nassar and its effects on pre-trial motions. If one ignores policy
concerns and cares only about strict adherence to the ruling in
Nassar, then the interpretations given by the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits are the closest in line with that thinking. 218 As discussed
above, both circuits have case law indicating that their outcomes
will be heavily influenced by Nassar. 219 District courts in both
213. See id. (“The Committee intends that these other laws modeled after
Title VII be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent with Title VII as
amended by this Act.”).
214. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Today’s
misguided judgment . . . should prompt yet another Civil Rights Restoration
Act.”).
215. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 2 (noting that the Act will correct
several Supreme Court cases).
216. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
217. See id. at 2454 (holding that “an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes
of vicarious liability under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the employer
to take tangible employment actions against the victim.”).
218. See supra Part IV (discussing a strict application of Nassar).
219. Supra Part IV.
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circuits were willing to reconsider motions for summary judgment
after Nassar, and decide that claims that had previously survived
summary judgment beforehand were no longer sufficient to go to
trial. 220 In these cases, the new but-for standard of causation
created a hurdle that the plaintiffs simply could not overcome. 221
This result seems more in line with the goals of the majority in
Nassar: to reduce the number of “frivolous” lawsuits filed by
plaintiffs. 222 Yet, while the majority may have been correct that
the number of retaliation claims filed by plaintiffs has risen over
the years, 223 it also ignores that empirical evidence suggests that
discrimination is still alive and well in the workplace. 224
Additionally, the practice of applying the causation standard
during the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework is
also probably more in line with the majority’s intent. The case
law indicates that when a plaintiff bears the burden of proving
but-for causation during the establishment of the prima facie
case, she is less likely to survive summary judgment. 225 This
second method, which has been adopted by the Third and
Seventh Circuits, and most likely the Fifth as well, will require
plaintiffs to identify particularly obvious evidence of
discrimination because the courts will be less inclined to draw
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 226 This can be especially
difficult for plaintiffs, however, because employers rarely leave

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531 (2013)
(expressing concern over the number of retaliation claims being filed annually).
223. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY
1997 THROUGH FY 2015 http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
charges.cfm (last visited Sept. 14, 2016) (showing a steady growth in number of
claims filed and a 2.2% increase in the number of retaliation claims filed from
2012 to 2013).
224. See, e.g., MAJORITY STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 111TH CONG., WOMEN
AND THE ECONOMY 2010: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 1
(2010) (noting that in 2009 the weekly wage for a woman was, on average,
eighty percent of a comparable man’s wages).
225. See supra Part II (discussing the effect of Nassar on summary
judgment); see also Holly, supra note 196, at 78 (“[U]nlike the Third Circuit, the
Second Circuit rejects application of the Nassar standard at the prima
facie level - making it much more likely . . . that pretext will become an issue.”).
226. See supra Part II (discussing summary judgment).

THE POWER TO RETALIATE

447

obvious evidence of their discriminatory intent. 227 If the goal of
Nassar is to limit a plaintiff’s ability to reach the jury, then
forcing plaintiffs to prove but-for causation during the
establishment of her prima facie case during summary judgment
advances this goal. 228
Finally, as to the issue of temporal proximity, a strict reading
of Nassar is inconsistent with the continued use of the doctrine.
As the D.C. Circuit has noted, the mere presumption that
temporal proximity creates is not enough to establish but-for
causation. 229 The purpose of temporal proximity is to help combat
an employer’s ability to hide its intent to discriminate by creating
a presumption in the plaintiff’s favor when there is suspicious
timing of events. 230 However, a presumption does not meet the
standard of the sole reason behind an employer’s decision that
Nassar requires. 231 Therefore, a judge who strictly adheres to
Nassar would most likely be forced to conclude that mere
temporal proximity cannot establish a prima facie case of
retaliation.
C. The Better Application of Nassar
While a strict application of Nassar may be more in line with
the intent of the majority in Nassar, it is not in line with the
intent of the Civil Rights Act. 232 Therefore, this Note encourages
227. See Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 2013)
(stating that employers rarely leave “smoking gun” evidence in discrimination
cases).
228. See supra Part II (showing that establishing causation during the
prima facie case often results in summary judgment being granted).
229. See Francis v. Perez, 970 F. Supp. 2d 48, 68 (D.D.C 2013) (“Given that
plaintiff offers no other evidence beyond temporality of a causal connection,
much less a but-for causal connection between her alleged protected activity and
the challenged actions, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could infer
retaliation”) (citations omitted).
230. See Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1998)
(“[Temporal proximity] is indirect proof of a causal connection between the firing
and the activity because it is strongly suggestive of retaliation.”).
231. See Williams v. Serra Chevrolet Auto. LLC, 4 F. Supp. 3d 865, 879
(E.D. Mich. 2014) (“Thus, applying the teachings of Nassar and Gross here,
temporal proximity alone is not enough to allow a reasonable inference of ‘butfor’ causation.”).
232. See supra Part VI.A (discussing congressional intent).
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judges to consider the larger policy concerns behind restricting a
plaintiff’s access to trial, and instead adopt an approach that
allows for some flexibility. The Second Circuit, especially, has put
forth several methods for circumventing Nassar, including its
rephrasing of the rule under Kwan. 233 Kwan’s phrasing of the
rule makes it clear that while an employer might put forth both
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons for its adverse
actions, the nondiscriminatory reasons do not preclude an
employee from bringing suit. 234 This interpretation is consistent
with Congressional intent because when amending Title VII
Congress stated that “any discrimination that is actually shown
to play a role in a contested employment decision may be the
subject of liability” and “the presence of a contributing
discriminatory factor would still establish a Title VII
violation[.]” 235
The Second Circuit is also unique for applying the standard
of causation in the last stage of the McDonnell Douglas
framework. 236 When a court applies the but-for standard of
causation during the last stage of the framework in relation to
pretext, the case law shows that a plaintiff has an easier time of
showing both a prima facie case and pretext. 237 This method
appears to limit the role of but-for causation as a gate keeper
during summary judgment proceedings because it turns
causation into a tie-breaker consideration rather than an
immediate hurdle for plaintiffs to cross. 238
Finally, the Second Circuit also ignores any contradiction
between the use of temporal proximity and a but-for standard of
causation. 239 Temporal proximity may still establish a prima facie
case in the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, and
the issue of causation will not come into play until the last stage
233. See supra Part V.B (examining Kwan).
234. See supra Part V.B (examining the language of Kwan).
235. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 19.
236. See supra Part II (discussing summary judgment).
237. See supra Part II (showing greater success depending on how courts
interpret Nassar).
238. See supra Part II (illustrating differences).
239. See supra Part III (examining the Second Circuit’s continued use of
temporal proximity).
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of the framework. 240 Additionally, the Second Circuit is far from
alone in seeing no conflict between these two rules. 241 The Third,
Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have all indicated that they intend
to preserve the doctrine of temporal proximity. 242
All three of the above approaches to Nassar illustrate policy
concerns regarding the creation of false negatives with a
heightened causation standard for retaliation claims. In addition
to these interpretations, judges may also want to consider
adopting the convincing mosaic test from the Seventh Circuit.
This test helps combat savvy employers, who are adept at hiding
discrimination, by taking in the totality of the circumstances, not
just looking for a single causal link between discrimination and
adverse action. 243 As Nancy Gertner, Harvard Law professor and
former United States District Judge for the District of Maryland,
pointed out, there is a fundamental contradiction when
discrimination cases, which revolve around the intent of the
employer, are often disposed of at the summary judgment
stage. 244 Other cases that center on intent, such as contract or
tort, require disputes over intent to be settled by juries, while
more often in discrimination cases judges are making that
determination themselves. 245 Supreme Court cases like Nassar
give judges tools to ignore context or implicit biases, and as a
result a “complex social phenomenon—discrimination—is
disaggregated, or ‘sliced and diced,’ into unrecognizable and
sometimes unintelligible boxes, determined by the judge, not the
jury, with predictable results.” 246
At the very least, the convincing mosaic test helps combat
this problem by forcing a judge to look at context and treat
240. See supra Part III (discussing the method used by the Second Circuit).
241. See supra Part III (comparing other circuits).
242. See supra Part III (comparing other circuits).
243. See supra Part V.A (discussing difficulties confronting plaintiffs).
244. See Nancy Gertner, Loser’s Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 112 (2012)
(“Employment discrimination cases, in contrast, are typically resolved on
summary judgment, although discriminatory intent may be more difficult to
identify on a cold record than is the intent of a contract’s drafters or a putative
tortfeasor’s state of mind.”).
245. See id. (explaining that there is a discrepancy between how intent is
treated in tort or contract compared to discrimination cases).
246. Id. at 123.
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discrimination claims similarly to tort or contract claims. It
should also make it harder for employers to “game” the system
because an employee may point to multiple indicators of
discrimination and not just a “smoking gun.”
VII. Conclusion
Nassar was decided contrary to the Congressional intent
behind the Civil Rights Act. Discrimination in the workplace is
often subtle, with savvy employers building pretextual cases
against employees with the intention of justifying discriminatory
behavior. The ruling of the Supreme Court makes it easier for
this subtlety to go by unchecked. While I agree with Justice
Ginsburg that the easiest solution is for Congress to amend the
Civil Rights Act again, I am doubtful that Congress will be
spurred to action by anything less than a litany of cases involving
Title VII. Therefore, it is up to judges to circumvent the dangers
of Nassar, and the fundamental unfairness of reducing a complex
issue such as discrimination into a rigid checklist of items to be
ticked off. While judges should always have the tools to dispense
with obviously frivolous claims, the approaches to retaliation
taken by the Second and Seventh Circuits show a deeper
understanding of the need for flexibility. I would encourage
judges to adopt and to continue developing these methods in an
effort to realize the spirit of the Civil Rights Act and to ensure a
fair system where employees can stand up to discrimination
without fear of retaliation.

